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H. HAMILTON HACKNEY IIItt
I. INTRODUCTION
F EW corporate managers faced with the task of ensuring compli-
ance with environmental regulations would argue that full com-
pliance with the broad array of requirements is truly feasible.' Yet
few members of the public likely would disagree that legislators in-
tended environmental protection laws, such as the Clean Water Act
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1. See Kepten D. Carmichael, Note, Strict Criminal Liability for Environmental
Violations: A Need forJudicial Restraint, 71 IND. L.J. 729, 748 (1996) (noting that
"[r]egulations under the Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, and RCRA number over
[sic] 9000 pages in the Code of Federal Regulations" and claiming that "[t] he EPA
has even acknowledged that one hundred percent compliance with certain CWA
requirements is not feasible"); PHILIP K. HowARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE:
How LAW IS SUFFOCATrNG AMERiCA 32 (1994) (discussing how full compliance with
administrative regulations may well be impossible). Consider United States v. White,
766 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Wash. 1991), in which the government charged the defend-
ants with unlawful disposal and storage of hazardous waste under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). See White, 766 F. Supp. at 877. The de-
fendants moved to dismiss the charges on the grounds that the regulations alleg-
edly violated were "impermissibly vague." See id. at 878. The district court cited
the testimony of an EPA Assistant Administrator for the EPA Office of Solid Waste
and Emergency Response, stating that "RCRA is a regulatory cuckoo land of defini-
tion... I believe we have five people in the agency who understand what 'hazard-
ous waste' is. What's hazardous one year isn't - wasn't hazardous yesterday, is
hazardous tomorrow, because we've changed the rules." Id. at 882. Despite the
court's recognition that the regulations were often confusing, the court declined
to find such regulations unconstitutional for vagueness. See id. at 882-83.
1
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(CWA),2 to play an essential role in ensuring the well-being of the
nation's citizenry. In other words, they would agree that the protec-
tion of "the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Na-
tion's waters"3 is, in itself, a project worthy of the close scrutiny of
government regulators and enforcement agents. 4 The tension cre-
ated by the intersection of these forces - regulatory complexity
resulting from command-and-control administrative agencies versus
a strong public expectation of regulatory enforcement - increases
when authorities rely upon criminal sanctions to punish noncom-
pliance. An unsurprising result has been frequent appeals from
convictions for environmental crimes.5
In light of the complexity of environmental statutes like the
CWA, and the consequences of violating these laws, environmental
criminal defense lawyers have argued that, to obtain a conviction,
the government should be required to prove a defendant knew the
illegality of his conduct.6 Courts have correctly rejected this argu-
2. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (1994) (commonly referred to as Clean Water Act [hereinafter
CWA]).
3. CWA § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a).
4. See Patrick W. Ward, Comment, The Criminal Provisions of the Clean Water Act
as Interpreted by the Judiciary and the Resulting Response From the Legislature, 5 DicK. J.
ENvTL. L. & PoL'v 399, 401 (1996) (stating that "[w]ithin [CWA's] regulations are
provisions for enforcement, which over the past three decades have become more
severe to coincide with popular culture's concern with our deteriorating environ-
ment"). Cf Philip M. Quatrochi, Note, Groundwater Jurisdiction Under the Clean
Water Act: The Tributary Groundwater Dilemma, B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 603, 603
(1996) (noting that "ninety percent of the United States's fresh water is ground-
water" and criticizing that "no federal statute comprehensively addresses the pre-
vention of groundwater pollution").
5. See, e.g., United States v. Kelley Technical Coatings, Inc., 157 F.3d 432 (6th
Cir. 1998) (appealing conviction under RCRA); United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d
251, 253 (4th Cir. 1997) (discussing challenge to district court's interpretation of
mens rea for felony convictions under CWA); United States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336
(11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 248 (1997) (appealing conviction for CWA
violations); United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. 1996) (appealing con-
viction for CWA violations); United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir.
1994) (appealing conviction for CWA violations).
6. See David S. Krakoff, Establish Environmental Defenses Early, PRAc. REAL EST.
LAw., Jan. 1998, at 9. Krakoff argues that the rule of United States v. International
Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971), that knowledge of illegality is not
required to prove a knowing violation of the law, is not practical in the area of
environmental regulation. See id. at 22. Noting the "complex network of permits,
inspections, and self-reporting" required by environmental statutes, Krakoff con-
cludes that "International Minerals did not contemplate such a regulatory regime."
Id.
See alsoJane F. Barrett, "Green Collar" Criminals: Why Should They Receive Special
Treatment?, 8 MD. J. CoNTEMp. LEGAL ISSUES 107, 107 (1996-97) (noting that
"[a]ccording to th[e] defense view, [among] the major problems with environ-
mental crimes are ... minimal or no mens rea requirements for these crimes. ... .");
cf. Carmichael, supra note 1, at 752 (concluding that courts should require govern-
[Vol. X: p. 1
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ment that the CWA's "knowledge" requirement means the govern-
ment must prove the defendant knew that his actions were
prohibited by law. 7 The common law has long rejected ignorance
of the law as a defense to its violation.8 The legislative history of the
CWA, moreover, strongly suggests that Congress did not intend
knowledge of illegality to be a requirement for conviction. 9
Prosecutors claim that the criminal defense bar has simply
urged the creation of a new category of federal criminal defendant,
the so-called "green collar" criminal, entitled to special treatment
denied persons accused of non-regulatory crimes.10 Nonetheless,
prosecutors too, have also sought to segregate environmental crimi-
nal defendants from other criminal defendants. The government
has contended that criminal violations of the CWA and other envi-
ment to prove high standard of mens rea under CWA in respect to legality of con-
duct; otherwise, such statutes will "make felons of a large number of innocent
people doing socially valuable work"); Michael Vitiello, Does Culpabability Matter?:
Statutory Construction Under 42 U.S.C. § 6978, 6 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 187, 191-92 (1993)
(observing that "[flailing to allow a defendant to negate knowledge of a permit
requirement may impose liability on a defendant lacking a culpable state of
mind").
7. See, e.g., United States v. Sinskey, 119 F.3d 712, 716 (8th Cir. 1997) (con-
cluding that legislative history of CWA supported holding that knowledge of ille-
gality was not required); United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 537-38 (2d Cir.
1995) (inferring from public welfare statutes and precedent that Congress never
intended that defendants must know actions were unlawful); Weitzenhoff 35 F.3d at
1283-86 (holding that in public welfare cases, government need not prove that
defendants knew their acts violated CWA).
8. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) ("The general rule
that ignorance of the law.., is no defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted
in the American legal system."); see also OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW
4748 (1881). Holmes explained the rationale for the rule as follows:
Ignorance of the law is no excuse for breaking it .... The true explana-
tion of the rule is the same as that which accounts for the law's indiffer-
ence to a man's particular temperament, faculties, and so forth. Public
policy sacrifices the individual to the general good .... It is no doubt
that there are many cases in which the criminal could not have known
that he was breaking the law, but to admit the excuse would be to en-
courage ignorance ....
Id. at 48.
9. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 262 (discussing design of Congress in light of 1987
amendments to CWA which "intended to facilitate enforcement of the Clean
Water Act"); but see Carmichael, supra note 1, at 734-35 (arguing that Congress
intended only to punish individuals who knew illegality of their actions).
10. See Barrett, supra note 6, at 107-13. Barrett, an Assistant United States
Attorney, accuses defense lawyers of trying to create the "green collar" crime cate-
gory so that violators of environmental law will be treated more favorably than
other criminal defendants. See id. at 107. The differences between environmental
law prosecutions and other criminal prosecutions cited by such defense attorneys
as justification for the "green collar" category are: (1) mens rea requirement for
environmental crimes is minimal and (2) federal prosecutors are overzealous in
this area. See id.
1999]
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ronmental statutes fall within the category of crimes known as "pub-
lic welfare" offenses.11 Under the public welfare doctrine, courts
have held that certain regulatory crimes require no showing of
traditional mens rea as a predicate to criminal liability. 12 The gov-
ernment has accordingly argued that, notwithstanding the statutory
"knowledge" requirement in alleging criminal violations of the
CWA, a conviction does not require proof that the defendant acted
with the requisite intent in respect to each of the elements of the
underlying statutory offense.1 3
Such a position misconstrues the nature of the public welfare
doctrine; to accept this argument, the courts would indeed create a
special category of "green collar" criminals, transforming environ-
mental statutes like the CWA into a virtual strict liability scheme.
Under such a scheme the government would, in essence, have to
make only the most minimal showing with respect to intent.14 In
evaluating the prosecutors' argument, this Article turns first to the
public welfare doctrine, briefly canvassing its creation and evolu-
tion. Next, the Article considers two recent cases in which courts
have attempted to limit the boundaries of the public welfare doc-
trine in the context of alleged violations of the CWA. Finally, the
Article concludes that courts should reject the argument that the
CWA requires only the most minimal showing of intent to sustain a
conviction.
11. See United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 391 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 618 (1994)). The Fifth Circuit rejected the
government's assertion that CWA violations are "public welfare offenses," exempt
from any mens rea requirement. See id. The court's reasoning was supported by the
statute's prohibition of acts which a reasonable person might believe to be legal
and thus not prohibited, as well as the statute's harsh penalties. See id. For a more
complete discussion of Ahmad, see infra notes 46-76 and accompanying text. See
also Wilson, 133 F.3d at 263-64 (concluding that government need only prove that
defendant knew of facts to meet each essential element of substantive offense, not
that defendant knew he was violating law).
12. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 258-59 (1952). The Morissette
Court justified the existence of such regulatory crimes as an exception to the gen-
eral rule that criminal prosecutions require a showing of "guilty mind" because
"[t] he accused, if he does not will the violation, usually is in a position to prevent it
with no more care than society might reasonably expect and no more exertion
than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his responsibilities." Id. For
a more complete discussion of Morissette, see infra notes 18-21 and accompanying
text. See also Note, Mens Rea in Federal Criminal Law, 111 IHARv. L. REv. 2402, 2403
(1998) [hereinafter Mens Rea) (discussing evolution of public welfare doctrine).
13. See Ahmad, 101 F.3d at 391 (holding that two of charged offenses were not
public welfare offenses and usual presumption of mens rea applied).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (providing for
strict liability under Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).
[Vol. X: p. 1
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II. CRIMINAL INTENT AND PUBLIC WELFARE OFFENSES
Under Anglo-American jurisprudence, criminal liability flows
from an intentional act.15 The mental state necessary for criminal
liability, or mens rea, may be viewed in varying degrees depending
upon the likelihood of intervention by chance.1 6 As the term is
used in American jurisprudence, mens rea is understood as "the re-
quirement of a 'guilty mind' with respect to an element of a
crime." 17
The significance of the criminal intent requirement cannot be
underestimated. As the Supreme Court opined in Morissette v.
United States,18 : "[t]he contention that an injury can amount to a
crime only when inflicted by intention is ... as universal and persis-
tent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will
15. See HYMAN GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 83-88 (1979) (conclud-
ing that act, although it poses significant threat of harm, "must be done intention-
ally if it is to be judged a culpable act"); see also HOLMES, supra note 8, at 67-68
(arguing that intent plays central role in establishing criminal liability because it
serves as indicator of what types of circumstances may follow particular act). The
risk of social harm is greater when one "intends" a harmful result and, therefore,
the intentional actor is treated more harshly. See id. Holmes notes that "[t]he
importance of the intent is not to show that the act was wicked, but to show that it
was likely to be followed by hurtful consequences." Id. at 68. The likelihood of
death is greater if an actor "intends" it to be the natural consequence of his act.
See id. Conversely, the likelihood of a death is not so great if the actor merely
drops a loaded gun and death is the unfortunate result. See id.
16. See Gross, supra note 15, at 87 (describing four measures of criminal culpa-
bility recognized by Model Penal Code: purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negli-
gently). Gross asserts, much like Holmes, that the difference among these degrees
of culpability is "that as the scale is ascended, conduct of each degree leaves suc-
ceedingly less room for chance to determine the occurrence of harm." Id. at 88.
17. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 n.3 (1994). In Staples, the
Court held that the government should have been required to prove that the de-
fendant, convicted of possession of an unregistered machine gun, knew that his
weapon was a machine gun regulated by law. See id. at 619. The Court rejected the
government's contention that this violation constituted a "public welfare offense"
which did not require the defendant to know the underlying facts that made his
conduct illegal. See id. at 606-18. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied
upon the common law rule that mens rea must be proven for every element of the
offense charged and that the silence of Congress does not dispense with this re-
quirement. See id. at 619.
18. 342 U.S. 246 (1952). Morissette was convicted of "knowingly" converting
for his own use property of the United States after he collected and sold appar-
ently abandoned shell casings left on an Air Force bombing range. See id. at 247.
Morissette appealed his conviction on the ground that since he thought the cas-
ings were abandoned, he did not possess the requisite mens rea. See id. at 249. The
Supreme Court agreed and held that "knowing conversion requires more than
knowledge that a defendant was taking the property into his possession." Id. at
270-71. Rather, the Court required him to have "knowledge of the facts, though
not necessarily the law, that made the taking a conversion." Id. at 271. To convict,
therefore, the government needed to prove that Morissette knew the bomb casings
were the property of the United States. See id.
1999]
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and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to
choose between good and evil."19 Thus, courts traditionally have
understood the codification of criminal laws to contain some intent
requirement, even if the requirement is not explicitly stated. 20
With the development of the regulatory state, the Supreme
Court recognized that Congress had the authority to create public
welfare offenses, or "regulatory offenses," which require a reduced
level of criminal intent as a predicate to their violation.21 As the
Court recognized in United States v. Dotterweich,22 the Congress dur-
ing the New Deal era extended the reach of the Commerce Clause
to protect "the lives and health of people which, in the circum-
stances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond self-protec-
tion."23 The Court continued, "[siuch legislation dispenses with
the conventional requirements for criminal conduct - awareness
of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it puts the
19. Id. at 250 (footnote omitted). See also Staples, 511 U.S. at 605 (stating
"[t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the
principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence") (quoting United States v.
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978)).
20. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252 (explaining that as legislatures "codified the
common law of crimes, even if their enactments were silent on the subject [of
intent], their courts assumed the omission did not signify disapproval of the princi-
ple but merely recognized that intent was so inherent in the idea of the offense
that it required no statutory affirmation"). See also Staples, 511 U.S. at 605-06 (not-
ing that "offenses that require no mens rea generally are disfavored" and that "some
indication of congressional intent, express or implied, is required to dispense with
mens rea as an element of a crime"); Mens Rea, supra note 12, at 2409 (discussing
common law presumption in favor of intent requirement).
21. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 258-59 (noting that Court first recognized such
offenses in United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 251, 252 (1922)). See also LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HIsTORY 286-90 (1993) (discussing
history and development of regulatory crimes); Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Of-
fenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 56 (1933) (coining term "public welfare offenses").
22. 320 U.S. 277 (1943). The government brought charges against a pharma-
ceutical corporation and Dotterweich, its president and general manager, for the
shipment of misbranded drugs and an adulterated drug in interstate commerce.
See id. at 278. The jury cleared the corporation of culpability, but found Dot-
terweich guilty on all counts. See id. The court of appeals, however, overturned
the conviction because the only "person" subject to prosecution under the relevant
act was the corporation. See id. at 279. In reversing the appellate court and rein-
stating the conviction, the Supreme Court held Dotterweich criminally liable for
the acts of the corporation, as a corporation can only act through its agents, even
though there was no showing that Dotterweich knew of the criminality of the cor-
poration's conduct. See id. at 284-85.
23. Id. at 280. See also Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in
the Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO.
LJ. 2407, 2529 n.167 (1995) (stating that "[b]y the 1930's, however, Congress be-
gan to exercise its Commerce Clause authority far more expansively . . .with a
series of crimes distinguished by the intensity of public concern rather than a
uniquely federal interest").
[Vol. X: p. 1
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burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but
standing in responsible relation to a public danger."24
Having sanctioned the creation of reduced-intent crimes
under the rubric of public welfare offenses, the Court has looked to
principles of statutory construction to ascertain whether Congress
intended the creation of such crimes. 25 In United States v. Interna-
tional Minerals & Chemical Corp.,26 for example, the Court consid-
ered whether Congress, in requiring that an individual must
"knowingly violate" a regulation to be convicted, intended to im-
pose criminal liability only when a defendant had knowledge of the
illegality of his conduct. 27 The defendant faced charges of shipping
sulfuric acid and hydrosulfuric acid in interstate commerce and
"knowingly fail [ing] to show on the shipping papers the required
classification of said property, to wit, Corrosive Liquid, in violation
of 49 C.F.R. 173.427."28 The enabling statute provided that "who-
ever knowingly violates" regulations regarding the safe transporta-
tion of corrosive liquids "shall be fined or imprisoned." 29 The
district court dismissed the charge, reasoning that the government
24. Dotterveich, 320 U.S. at 281. See also Morissette, 342 U.S. at 258-59 (observ-
ing that regulatory offenses are adjunct to "regulatory measures in the exercise of
what is called the police power where the emphasis of the statute is evidently upon
achievement of some social betterment"); AndrewJ. Turner, Mens Rea in Environ-
mental Crime Prosecutions: IgnorantiaJuris and the White Collar Criminal, 23 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 217, 220 (1998) (discussing public welfare offenses as "a category of
crimes that threaten injury to individuals or property for which intent is not a
necessary element of the violations").
25. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 258-59; see also Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S.
419, 424 (1985) (stating that legislature must define elements of criminal offense);
United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 253 (1922) (determining mental state re-
quired for commission of crime requires "construction of the statute and ... infer-
ence of the intent of Congress"). As one commentator has observed, though the
high court generally takes a textualist approach to intent requirements, that ap-
proach is frequently inconsistent. See Mens Rea, supra note 12, at 2414.
26. 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
27. See id. at 562-63.
28. Id. at 559.
29. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 834(f)). This section of the United States Code
grants the Interstate Commerce Commission "power to 'formulate regulations for
the safe transportation' of corrosive liquids." Id. Furthermore, the regulation
provided:
[e]ach shipper offering for transportation any hazardous material subject
to the regulations in this chapter, shall describe that article on the ship-
ping paper by the shipping name prescribed in § 172.5 of this chapter
and by the classification prescribed in § 172.5 of this chapter, and may
add a further description not inconsistent therewith. Abbreviations must
not be used.
49 C.F.R. § 173.427.
1999]
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failed to claim a "knowing violation" in the information; the govern-
ment then appealed. 30
The defendant argued before the Supreme Court that the gov-
ernment had to prove the defendant had "knowledge" of the regu-
lation at issue.31 The Court noted that Congress had rejected strict
liability in regard to the transportation of corrosive substances and
concluded that the use of the word "knowingly" in the statute indi-
cated the existence of a mens rea requirement.32 Still, it did not
follow that Congress had created an exception "to the rule that ig-
norance of the law is no excuse." 33 The Court concluded that,
when "dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious
waste materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so great
that anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing
with them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation. '34 In
short, the Court reasoned that in the public welfare context, the
term "knowingly" applies to factual knowledge, "such as knowledge
that corrosive liquids are possessed, rather than knowledge of the
regulations that govern possession of the materials. '3 5
And so two principles have emerged from the Court's public
welfare offense jurisprudence. The first principle, as articulated in
cases like Dotterweich and Morissette, is that Congress may create re-
duced-intent crimes within the realm of regulatory offenses. 36 The
30. See International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 559.
31. See United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558,
560 (1971). Relying on its ruling in Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S.
337 (1952), the Court noted that "'[ti he statute punishes only those who know-
ingly violate the Regulation. This requirement of the presence of culpable intent
as a necessary element of the offense does much to destroy any force in the argu-
ment that application of the Regulation would be so unfair that it must be held
invalid.'" International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 560 (quoting Boyce, 342 U.S. at 342-43).
32. See id. at 561.
33. Id. The Court explained:
The principle that ignorance of the law is no defense applies whether the
law be a statute or a duly promulgated and published regulation. In the
context of these proposed 1960 amendments [18 U.S.C. § 834(f)] we de-
cline to attribute to Congress the inaccurate view that that Act requires
proof of knowledge of the law, as well as the facts, and that it intended to
endorse that interpretation by retaining the word "knowingly." We con-
clude that the meager legislative history of the 1960 amendments makes
unwarranted the conclusion that Congress abandoned the general rule
and required knowledge of both the facts and the pertinent law before a
criminal conviction could be sustained under this Act.
Id. at 563.
34. Id. at 565.
35. Turner, supra note 24, at 224.
36. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 258-59 (1952) (examining
nature and quality of offense in determining mens rea requirement); United States
v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280-81 (1943) (citing United States v. Balint, 258 U.S.
Vol. X: p. 1
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second principle is that the public welfare nature of these offenses
justifies a rule that reduced intent does not require knowledge of
an act's illegality.37 In reviewing the public welfare cases, the Court,
in Staples v. United States,3 8 noted that it will recognize such offenses
only in "limited circumstances":
Typically, our cases recognizing such offenses involve stat-
utes that regulate potentially harmful or injurious items.
In such situations, we have reasoned that as long as a de-
fendant knows that he is dealing with a dangerous device
of a character that places him in responsible relation to a
public danger, he should be alerted to the probability of
strict regulation, and we have assumed in such cases Con-
gress intended to place the burden on the defendant to
ascertain at his peril whether his conduct comes within the
inhibition of the statute.
39
In sum, when conduct involves certain particularly dangerous activi-
ties or materials, a defendant will be presumed to be aware that the
conduct is regulated; the public welfare doctrine obviates the gov-
ernment's burden of proving that the defendant knew his conduct
was illegal. Two recent cases before federal appellate courts illus-
trate the application of these principles against the background of a
complex regulatory statute, the CWA.
III. THE LIMrrs OF KNOWLEDGE
In 1972, Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act Amendments, commonly known as the Clean Water Act
(CWA). 40 As amended, the CWA provides that "any one who know-
250 (1922) and stating "[i]n the interest of the larger good [regulatory legislation]
puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but stand-
ing in responsible relation to a public danger"). For a discussion of Morissette, see
supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text; for a discussion of Dotterweich, see supra
notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
37. See Turner, supra note 24, at 220 (noting that intent is not necessary be-
cause public welfare offenses threaten injury to individuals and property and that
threat can be mitigated by exercising reasonable care)
38. 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
39. Id. at 607 (quotations, citations and ellipses omitted). One commentator
has suggested that the Staples decision indicates a retreat from the continued rec-
ognition of public welfare offenses. See Mens Rea, supra note 12, at 2403 (explain-
ing explicit refusal by Supreme Court to extend public welfare exception).
40. See Victor B. Flatt, A Dirty River Runs Through It (The Failure of Enforcement in
the Clean Water Act), 25 B.C. ENVrL. Arr. L. REv. 1, 7 (1997) (citing S. REP. No. 92-
144 (1972) and noting that "the ever-mounting pollution resulting from the indus-
trial revolution and the increasing urban population largely had gone unchecked,
despite repeated efforts to address the problem"). The earlier efforts were aimed
1999]
9
Friedman and Hackney: Questions of Intent: Environmental Crimes and Public Welfare Offe
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
10 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
ingly violates" any of a number of the Act's provisions commits a
felony.41 In United States v. Ahmad42 and United States v. Wilson,43 the
federal courts considered whether "knowingly" refers to knowledge
of the underlying conduct constituting each element of the offense,
to knowledge of the illegality of the conduct, or to both kinds of
knowledge. 44
A. United States v. Ahmad
In 1992, Attique Ahmad (Ahmad) purchased a combination
convenience store/gas station with two gasoline pumps, each fed by
an 8,000-gallon underground tank.45 Ahmad discovered that one
of the tanks, which held high-octane gasoline, had developed a
leak.46 In October 1993, Ahmad hired a tank testing company to
examine the tank, the results of which indicated that the tank con-
tained approximately 800 gallons of water and that the rest was
at pollution control, but still gave deference to local authority. See id. The 1972
Amendments, however, federalized pollution control and clean-up, departing sig-
nificantly from the previous approach. See id. See also Barrett, supra note 6, at 108-
09 (explaining how CWA violations started as misdemeanors and then violation
provisions were amended to include both misdemeanor and felony offenses).
41. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A). The statute provides:
(2) Knowing violations
Any person who -
(A) knowingly violates section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1321 (b) (3),
1328, or 1345 of this title, or any permit condition or limitation imple-
menting any of such sections in a permit issued under section 1342 of this
title by the Administrator or by a State, or any requirement imposed in a
pretreatment program approved under section 1342(a) (3) or 1342(b) (8)
of this tide or in a permit issued under section 1344 of this title by the
Secretary of the Army or by a State; shall be punished by a fine of not less
than $2,500 nor more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by imprison-
ment for not more than 1 year, or both. If a conviction of a person is for
a violation committed after a first conviction of such person under this
paragraph, punishment shall be by a fine of not more than $50,000 per
day of violation, or by imprisonment of not more than 2 years, or by both.
Id. § 309(c) (2) (A), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A). See Sean J. Bellew & Daniel T.
Surtz, Note, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws: A Corporate Guide to Avoiding
Liability, 8 ViLE. ENVr. L.J. 205, 214-16 (1997) (discussing criminal sanctions under
CWA).
42. 101 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. 1996).
43. 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997).
44. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 260-65; Ahmad, 101 F.3d at 389-91. Congress
amended the CWA in 1987 "to increase penalties for violations of the Act. Con-
gress substituted the term 'knowingly' for the earlier intent requirement of 'will-
fully.' The stated purpose was to deter would-be polluters." Turner, supra note 24,
at 222 (footnotes omitted). See also S. REP. No. 99-50, at 29 (1985) (discussing
reasons to amend CWA).
45. See Ahmad, 101 F.3d at 387.
46. See id.
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mostly gasoline. 47 When Ahmad inquired about emptying the tank
himself, the company informed him that it would be dangerous and
illegal to do so. 48
On January 25, 1994, Ahmad rented a hand-held pump and
pumped 5,220 gallons from the leaky tank, of which approximately
4,690 gallons were gasoline. 49 Some of the waste liquid from the
tank ran down the street and some drained into a manhole cover in
front of the store.50 Via these two routes, the gasoline entered a
nearby creek and the sanitary sewer system.51 Within a day, investi-
gators had traced the gasoline back to Ahmad's store.52
Ahmad was indicted for three violations of the CWA: (1)
"knowingly discharging a pollutant from a point source into a navi-
gable water of the United States without a permit . . . (count
one) ;' 53 (2) "knowingly operating a source in violation of a pre-
47. See id.
48. See id. Ahmad inquired about the cost to have the testing company empty
the tank. See id. The company estimated 65 cents per gallon and $65 per hour of
labor. See id. After hearing this estimate, Ahmad inquired about emptying the
tank himself and the company's employee told him it would be dangerous and
illegal. See id. This employee testified that Ahmad then stated, "Well, if I don't get
caught, what then?" Id.
49. See id.
50. See United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 387 (5th Cir. 1996).
51. See id. The gasoline discharged into the street entered a storm drain, con-
tinued through the sewer system, and emptied into a nearby creek - which ulti-
mately flowed into Lake Houston. See id. Several trucks were required to
decontaminate the creek. See id. The gasoline discharged into the manhole
flowed through the sanitary system and eventually landed in the city sewage treat-
ment plant. See id. To handle the 1,000 gallon pool of gasoline thus created, the
plant supervisor ordered a partial evacuation of the plant. See id. The fire depart-
ment also ordered the evacuation of two nearby schools. See id.
52. See id. By 9:00 a.m. on January 26, 1994, investigators traced the source of
the contamination back to the manhole in front of Ahmad's store. See id. When
questioned by investigators, Ahmad first denied operating a pump the night
before. See id. He then admitted to having used the pump, but claimed that he
did not pump anything from the tanks. See id.
53. Id. The relevant provisions are:
§ 1311 Effluent limitations
(a) Illegality of pollutant discharges except in compliance with law
Except as in compliance with this section and sections 1312, 1316,





Any person who -
(A) knowingly violates section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1321(b)(3),
1328, or 1345 of this title, or any permit condition. . . , or any require-
ment imposed in a retreatment program .... shall be punished by a fine
of not less than $5,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not
more than 3 years, or by both ....
1999]
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treatment standard... (count two);",54 and (3) "knowingly placing
another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily in-
jury by discharging a pollutant . . . (count three) .'' 5  At trial,
Ahmad argued that the discharge of gasoline was not "knowing"
because he believed he was discharging water. 56
On appeal, Ahmad asserted that the district court improperly
instructed the jury on the mens rea required for counts one and two,
CWA§ 301(a), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), CWA§ 309(c) (2) (A), 1319(c) (2) (A) (1994).
The navigable United States water requirement was met as the gasoline discharged
by Ahmad "entered a storm drain and the storm sewer system and flowed through
a pipe that eventually empties into Possum Creek .... Possum Creek feeds into
San Jacinto River, which eventually flows into Lake Houston." Ahmad, 101 F.3d at
388.
54. Id. Section 1317(d) reads:
§ 1317 Toxic and Pretreatment effluent standards
(d) Operation in violation of standards unlawful
After the effective date of any effluent standard or prohibition or pre-
treatment standard promulgated under this section, it shall be unlawful
for any owner or operator of any source to operate any source in violation
of any such effluent standard or prohibition or pretreatment standard.
CWA § 307(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(d) (1994). A "source" is defined as "any building,
structure, facility, or installation from which there is or may be the discharge of
pollutants." Id. § 306(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a). "Pretreatment standards" involve
"standard[s] of performance," "a standard for the control of the discharge of pol-
lutants. .. ." Id. Pretreatment standards are more stringent than ordinary stan-
dards of performance, and are developed in regulations "for introduction of
pollutants into treatment works which are publicly owned for those pollutants
which are determined not to be susceptible to treatment by such treatment works
or which would interfere with the operation of such treatment works." Id.
§ 307(b) (1), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b) (1).





(A) Any person who knowingly violates [provisions previously stated in
§ 1319 (c) (2) (A)], and who knows at that time that he thereby places
another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury
shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than $250,000 or
imprisonment of not more than 15 years, or both ....
CWA § 309(c) (3), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (3) (1994).
56. See Ahmad, 101 F.3d at 388-89. At trial, Ahmad did not dispute that he had
discharged gasoline from the tank or that the gasoline landed in Possum Creek
and the storage treatment plant. See id. Rather, he argued that his discharge of
gasoline was not "knowing" because he thought he was only discharging water. See
id. at 389.
One key piece of evidence Ahmad sought to introduce in district court to
support the theory that he did not act "knowingly" was the testimony of two wit-
nesses who would have told the jury that he was at the store only until 7:30 or 8:00
p.m. on the night in question. See id. The purpose of the testimony would be to
show that Ahmad did not "knowingly" discharge gasoline himself, but negligently
left his employees in charge of handling the pump. See id. The district court
found this testimony irrelevant and excluded it. See id. The jury found Ahmad
guilty on counts one and two, but deadlocked on the third count. See id.
[Vol. X: p. I
12
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol10/iss1/1
QUESTIONS OF INTENT
and erred in finding irrelevant the testimony that Ahmad sought to
introduce to show that he did not act knowingly, but acted negli-
gently by leaving control of the pump to his employees. 57 Ahmad
argued that the district court should have instructed the jury that
the statutory mens rea requirement applied to each element of each
offense, not just to the discharge or operation of a source. 58 In
contrast, the government maintained that the words "knowingly vio-
lates" require it to prove only the defendant's knowledge of the na-
ture of the acts and that the defendant performed those acts
intentionally. 59 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit faced the question
whether "knowingly" applied to the element that the discharge in-
volved a pollutant, "for Ahmad's main theory at trial was that he
thought he was discharging water, not gasoline."60
The court reviewed precedent on the issue and noted "the
long-held view that the presumption in favor of a scienter require-
57. See id. The district court instructed the jury that to find Ahmad guilty, the
government merely had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he "knowingly
discharged" a pollutant. See id. With respect to count two, the court's instructions
held the burden on the prosecution was to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant "was the owner or operator of a source [and] knowingly operated
that source by discharging into a public sewer system. [a pollutant]." Id. For a
listing of the instructions and the elements according to the lower court, see infra
notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
58. See id. at 389. The jury instructions for the first count stated that the gov-
ernment must prove beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) That on or about the date set forth in the indictment,
(2) the defendant knowingly discharged
(3) a pollutant
(4) from a point source
(5) into the navigable waters of the United States
(6) without a permit to do so.
Id.
59. See id. The jury instructions for the second count stated that the govern-
ment must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
(1) That on or about the date set forth in the indictment,
(2) the defendant,
(3) who was the owner or operator of a source,
(4) knowingly operated that source by discharging into a public sewer
system or publicly owned treatment works
(5) a pollutant that created a fire or explosion hazard in that public sewer
system or publicly owned treatment works.
Id.
60. Id. at 389. Because Ahmad had requested different instructions in the
lower court, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the lower court's refusal under the abuse of
discretion standard. See id. Under this standard, the Fifth Circuit would affirm "if
the charge, viewed in its entirety, is a correct statement of the law that plainly
instructs jurors on the relevant principles of law... [and] reverse... if the instruc-
tions do not correctly state the law." Id. (citations omitted). See generally, United
States v. Gray, 96 F.3d 769, 775 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Townsend, 31 F.3d
262, 270 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Allibhai, 939 F.2d 244, 251 (5th Cir.
1991) (explaining, in all three cases, correct standard of review).
1999)
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ment should apply to each of the statutory elements which criminal-
ize otherwise innocent conduct."61 After a brief review of Fifth
Circuit cases, the court concluded that it was "eminently sensible"
that the phrase "knowingly violates" uniformly applies to each ele-
ment that defines CWA offenses, rather than applying only to select
elements of these offenses.62
The Fifth Circuit distinguished those cases concerning a mis-
take-of-law defense, and explained that CWA violations do not fall
within the judicially-created exception for public welfare offenses. 63
The court also rejected the government's argument that the in-
structions, considered as a whole, indicated to the jury that Ahmad
should be found guilty only if he knew he was discharging gaso-
line.64 The court considered it likely that the jury understood the
instructions to require a finding of knowledge only in respect to
acts constituting a discharge. 65 Because there was at least a reason-
61. Ahmad, 101 F.3d at 389-90. The main issue was "whether 'knowingly' ap-
plies to the element of the discharges being a pollutant." Id. at 390. This issue is
especially difficult to resolve because mens rea is not listed in the section of the
statute defining the elements of the offense. See id.
62. Id. Interestingly, the "knowingly violates" language appears elsewhere in
the language of the CWA, but does not appear in the section defining the ele-
ments of a violation. See id. The Fifth Circuit stated that to reach a contrary hold-
ing "would require an explanation as to why some elements should be treated
differently from others, which neither the parties nor the caselaw seems able to
provide." Id. The court supported its conclusion both with prior decisions of the
Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court. See id. The court began with the presump-
tion which supports the idea that a scienter element is required for each element
of the offense where, as here, the statute criminalizes typically innocent conduct.
See id. (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994)).
The court then determined its holding in Ahmad was consistent with precedent:
The Supreme Court has spoken to this issue in broad terms. In United
States v. X-Citement Video, Inc ... the Court read "knowingly" to apply
to each element of a child pornography offense, notwithstanding its con-
clusion that under the "most natural grammatical reading" of the statute
it should apply only to the element of having transported, shipped, re-
ceived, distributed or reproduced the material at issue.
Id. (citing X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. at 68-69). See Staples v. United States, 511
U.S. 600, 619-20 (1994) (holding statutes criminalizing knowing possession of
machine gun require defendants not only to know that they possess firearms, but
that those firearms are machine guns).
63. See Ahmad, 101 F.3d at 390 (quoting X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. at 64,
in which Supreme Court read "knowingly" to apply to each element of child por-
nography offense).
64. See id.
65. See id. As support for this conclusion, the court pointed to its own deci-
sion in United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc., in which it concluded that a convic-
tion for "knowing and improper storage of hazardous wastes" requires that the
defendant know "factually" what it is doing - storing, what is being stored, and
that what is stored has the potential for harm to others or the environment, and
that it has no permit. See id. at 390 (citing United States v. Baytank (Houston),
Inc., 934 F.2d 599, 613 (5th Cir. 1991)). The court added that "[t]o hold other-
[Vol. X: p. 1
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able likelihood that the jury applied the instructions in this way, the
Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that the instructions misled the
jury as to the elements of the offense. 66
In rejecting the government's argument that violations of the
CWA are public welfare offenses, the Fifth Circuit labored to ex-
plain that the public welfare exception is narrow, and that viola-
tions of the CWA simply did not fall within its ambit.6 7 The court
noted, for example, that CWA violations are felony offenses punish-
able by significant terms in federal prison.68 This reasoning, how-
ever, is inconsistent with prior caselaw. As discussed above, the
Supreme Court has determined that the applicability of the public
welfare doctrine depends to a certain extent upon an inquiry into
whether a statute concerns the regulation of dangerous activities or
materials that could affect public health and safety - an inquiry
the Ahmad court declined to undertake in any detail. 69
wise would require an explanation as to why some elements would be treated dif-
ferently from others, which neither the parties nor the caselaw seems to be able to
support." Id.
66. See id. at 390-91. The court rejected the government's reliance on United
States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 537-41 (2d Cir. 1995), and United States v. Weitzenhoff,
35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1994), for the proposition that the government need not
demonstrate that the defendant knew his acts were illegal. See Ahmad, 101 F.3d at
390-91. The court distinguished these cases based on the fact that neither directly
addressed the mistake of fact or statutory construction issues raised by Ahmad. See
id.
67. See id. at 391. To avoid bringing Ahmad within the narrow public welfare
exception, the Fifth Circuit compared the danger to that in Staples. See id. Because
the Supreme Court rejected the public welfare doctrine in respect to a statute
involving machine guns, and because gasoline could not be considered as danger-
ous, the exception could not apply. See id. "Though gasoline is a 'potentially
harmful or injurious item,' it is certainly no more so than machine guns ....
[T]he key to the public welfare offense analysis is whether 'dispensing with mens
rea would require the defendant to have knowledge only of traditionally lawful
conduct.'" Id. (quoting Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 618 (1994)).
68. See United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 391 (5th Cir. 1996). The Fifth
Circuit concluded that this strict punishment militated against finding the public
welfare exception applicable because "public welfare offenses have virtually always
been crimes punishable by relatively light penalties such as fines or short jail
sentences, rather than substantial terms of imprisonment." Id. (citing Staples, 511
U.S. at 618). The rationale for this is that "[i]n a system that generally requires a
'vicious will' to establish a crime, . . . imposing severe punishments for offenses
that require no mens rea would seem incongruous." Staples, 511 U.S. at 617 (cita-
tions omitted) (quoting 4 WiLLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF
ENGLAND *21 (1765-69)).
See also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952) (holding public
welfare offense exception generally applies when punishment is light and there is
little harm to the offender's reputation); Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302,
310 (8th Cir. 1960) (finding that public welfare exception commonly applies
where associated penalty is relatively slight).
69. See Ahmad, 101 F.3d at 389-91.
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On its face, the CWA certainly appears to concern public wel-
fare offenses. Such crimes are those not simply involving danger-
ous devices and activities, but those that could adversely affect
public health and safety across broad populations. 70 By these stan-
dards, violations of environmental statutes like the CWA are argua-
bly public welfare offenses. 71 Given the legislative determination
that the integrity of the nation's ecosystems and waterways is of par-
amount concern, and the commonsense realization that, for exam-
ple, discharging pollutants into surface waters will be adverse to
human health and to the environment, an individual can reason-
ably be expected to know that the government regulates such
activities. 72
To be sure, the Ahmad court correctly rejected the govern-
ment's argument that prosecutors do not have to show that the de-
fendant had knowledge of the facts underlying each element of the
offense in proving violations of the CWA. 73 The better explanation
for rejecting this argument, however, lies in a fuller understanding
of the public welfare doctrine.74 That explanation was articulated
70. See generally, Barrett, supra note 6, at 117-18 (discussing reasons for declar-
ing CWA public welfare statute). For a discussion of the dangers necessary to con-
stitute a public welfare offense, see supra notes 11-15. For the text of the
applicable sections of the CWA, see supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
71. See id. at 117-18 (arguing that CWA is public welfare statute). Citing
CWA's express purpose of "restor[ing] the chemical, physical and biological integ-
rity of the nation's waters," the author points to United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d
1275 (9th Cir. 1994) and United States v. Ellen, 961 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1992), as
support for the proposition that Congress designed CWA to prevent serious threats
to public health, welfare and safety. See id. The author further explains that a
material need not be deemed hazardous or toxic by statute in order to be danger-
ous enough to qualify a statute as one of public welfare. See id. What is "danger-
ous" varies depending upon the circumstances, location, and nature of the activity.
See id. Accordingly, what might be dangerous in one circumstance may not be in
another: "[t]hrough [CWA] and other environmental laws, Congress has deter-
mined that harm to the environment - even absent imminent threats to public
health, welfare, or safety is a public policy concern of the greatest magnitude." Id.
at 118.
72. See Ahmad, 101 F.3d at 388 (pointing out that defendant had been in-
formed of danger and illegality of dispersing contents of tanks).
73. See id. at 391.
74. See, e.g., Turner, supra note 24, at 228 (explaining that commentators have
criticized Ahmad court for holding that mens rea of knowledge applies to each ele-
ment of offense, with exception of purely jurisdictional elements). These com-
mentators argue that the Ahmad opinion sends "mixed signals." See id. The case
has been interpreted to require the government to prove that the defendant had
knowledge of the law. See id. In addition, some commentators view the opinion as
a departure from precedent in environmental prosecutions because of its holding
that the charged offenses were not "public welfare" offenses. See id. at 229. The
court did not directly declare, however, that knowledge of the law must be proved;
nor did it require the government to show knowledge that the gas was a "pollu-
tant." See id. Rather, the court's specific ground for reversal was its "concern that
16
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by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Wilson,75 to which we next
turn.
B. United States v. Wilson
United States v. Wilson involved alleged CWA violations concern-
ing the unpermitted excavation and filling of wetlands on four par-
cels adjacent to property being developed by the defendants. 76
From 1988 through 1993, without seeking permits or approvals
from the Army Corps of Engineers, the defendants attempted to
drain at least three of the four parcels by digging ditches and de-
positing the excavated dirt next to the ditches, a process known as
"sidecasting."77 The defendants also transported fill dirt and gravel
to three of the parcels.78  Portions of each parcel contained
wetlands. 79
At trial, the government presented extensive evidence about
the physical presence and characteristics of the wetlands. 80 The
government also produced evidence that the defendants were
the jury may have believed that Ahmad only needed to be aware that he was dis-
charging 'something' in order to be convicted." Id. Thus, the Fifth Circuit re-
versed because it believed the lower court had denied Ahmad a mistake-of-fact
defense, not a mistake-of-law defense. See id.
75. 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997).
76. See id. at 254. The defendants were James J. Wilson, chief executive and
chair of the board of directors of co-defendant Interstate General Company, and
St. Charles Associates, L.P. See id. Wilson was personally responsible for decisions
relevant to alleged CWA violations. See id. Interstate General was a publicly traded
land development company worth more than $100 million, and the general part-
ner of St. Charles Associates, which owned land being developed within the
planned community of St. Charles in Charles County, Maryland. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id. The government provided evidence that the defendants trans-
ported a "substantial amount" of fill dirt and gravel, and deposited it on three of
the four parcels. See id. Only the fourth parcel involved sidecasting without the
addition of fill. See id.
79. See id. Importantly, the government demonstrated that all four parcels
contained wetlands and that the defendants did not obtain permits from the Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps) to drain and fill the parcels. See id. The Corps is
charged with issuing permits for such activity under section 1344 of the CWA. See
id.
80. See United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1997). The evi-
dence included:
testimonial and photographic evidence of significant sanding water, re-
ports of vegetation typical to hydrologic soils, and infrared aerial photo-
graphs showing a pattern of stream courses visible under the
vegetation .... [P]roperties were identified as containing wetlands on
public documents. . . . [W]ater from these lands flowed in a drainage
pattern through ditches, intermittent streams, and creeks, ultimately join-
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aware of the land's physical conditions.81 This evidence included:
the defendants' efforts to improve drainage on the land; their addi-
tion of substantial amounts of fill to raise the ground level; re-
peated reshoring efforts due to "wetness-induced" ground shifting
and collapse; differential price quotations on bids for work depend-
ing upon the level of moisture on the property; and testimony that,
notwithstanding the efforts at filling the land, "wetland-loving
plants continued to sprout through the fill."82
The defendants produced evidence challenging the govern-
ment's argument that the parcels were wetlands subject to regula-
tion under the CWA.8 3 They sought to show that the Army Corps of
Engineers was inconsistent in asserting jurisdiction over the parcels
and had suggested in an internal memorandum that it was "not
clear.., that these areas can be interpreted as 'waters of the United
States' within the meaning or purview of [the CWA]. '"84 In addi-
tion, the defendants introduced evidence reflecting their beliefs
that draining the three parcels before filling them was entirely legal
and that no fill went into the fourth parcel, where ditches were be-
ing used to drain the area.85
The jury convicted the defendants on four felony counts of
"knowingly discharging fill material and excavated dirt into wet-
lands on four separate parcels without a permit, in violation of the
CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c) (2) (A) & 1311(a)." 86 The district court
81. See id.
82. Id. The government also produced evidence at trial that the defendants
retained a private consulting firm which informed them that it believed, based
upon its observations, that the parcels contained wetlands. See id. According to
the evidence introduced by the government, this private consulting firm recom-
mended that the defendants seek permits from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
prior to beginning development of the land. See id. Further evidence introduced
by the government at trial showed that the defendants were contacted by zoning
authorities from Charles County, who were concerned with the possibility that the
construction projects were located in an area containing wetlands. See id. Finally,
the government produced evidence showing that the defendants continued to de-
velop other parcels of land without notifying the Corps while, at the same time,
they were complying with an order from the Corps to cease construction on an-
other parcel. See id.
83. See id.
84. Id. The defendants argued that the Corps was inconsistent in dealing with
the four parcels of land at issue in the case because they had asserted jurisdiction
over only one of the parcels, while they were aware of the development of all four
parcels. See id. The defendants also argued that the Corps itself was uncertain
whether the areas in question could rightfully be considered "waters of the United
States." See id. The internal memorandum of the Corps, which the defendants
introduced at trial, suggested that they obtain guidance from higher officials
within the Corps as to what would constitute "waters of the United States." See id.
85. See United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1997).
86. Id. at 254. Section 1319(c) (2) of the Act provides:
[Vol. X: p. I
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sentenced Wilson to twenty-one months in prison, one year super-
vised release, and a fine of $1 million, and fined the other two de-
fendants $3 million, placing each on five years probation. 87 Finally,
the court ordered the defendants to implement a government-pro-
posed wetlands restoration and mitigation plan.8 8
On appeal, the defendants argued, among other things, that
the district court improperly instructed the jury regarding the mens
rea necessary to prove a felony violation of the CWA.89 The defend-
ants insisted that the trial court should have instructed the jury that
the government had to prove that the defendants knew their con-
duct was illegal. 90 The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, con-
cluding that criminal intent in this context did not require
knowledge of the illegality of one's conduct, but only that the de-
Any person who-
(A) Knowingly violates section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1321(b)(3),
1328, or 1345 of this title, or any permit condition or limitation imple-
menting any of such sections in a permit issued under section 1342 of this
title by the Administrator or by a State, or any requirement imposed in a
pretreatment program approved under section 1342(a) (3) or 1342(b) (8)
of this title or in a permit issued under section 1344 of this title by the
Secretary of the Army or by a State; or
(B) ... shall be punished by a fine of not less than $5,000 nor more than
$50,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than 3
years, or by both.
CWA § 309(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2). Section 1311(a) of the Act provides:
(a) Illegality of pollutant discharges except in compliance with law:
Except as in compliance with this section and section 1312, 1316, 1317,
1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any
person shall be unlawful.
Id. § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
87. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 254.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 260.
90. See id. The trial court instructed the jury that the government must prove
the four elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. One of the
elements required the government to show that the defendants knowingly dis-
charged a pollutant. See id. See also 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (explaining illegality of
discharging pollutants). The trial court then defined an act as knowingly "if it is
done voluntarily and intentionally and not because of ignorance, mistake, accident
or other innocent reason." Wilson, 133 F.3d at 260. For each count, the trial court
stated:
the government must prove that the defendants knew, one, that these
areas which are the subject of these discharges had the general character-
istics of a wetland; and, two, the general nature of their acts. The govern-
ment does not have to prove that the defendants knew the actual legal
status of wetlands or the actual legal status of the materials discharged
into the wetlands. The government does not have to prove that the defendants
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fendant have knowledge of the facts that make his conduct illegal.91
In the court's view, Congress intended "that the defendant have
knowledge of each of the elements constituting the proscribed con-
duct even if he were unaware of their legal significance." 92
Importantly, the Fourth Circuit, in supporting its conclusion,
satisfactorily reconciled the intent requirement with the dictates of
the public welfare doctrine.93 Unlike the Ahmad court, the Fourth
Circuit acknowledged that CWA violations implicate the "public
welfare" doctrine:
Even though the materials involved in this case, fill and
native soil from a wetland, may not be inherently deleteri-
ous, the Clean Water Act is, as a general matter, largely
91. See id. at 262. The court arrived at this conclusion by recognizing two
general common law principles of criminal intent. See id. at 261. The first princi-
ple was that "in Anglo-American jurisprudence, criminal offenses are ordinarily
required to have a mens rea." Id. (citing Staples, 511 U.S. at 605). The second
principle that the court relied on was that "ignorance of the law provides no de-
fense to its violation." Id. (citing Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991)
and Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. 404, 411 (1833)). As a corollary to the second
principle, the court stated, "while some level of deliberateness is usually required
to impose criminal punishment, it is also usually true that the defendant need not
appreciate the illegality of his conduct." Id.
92. Id. at 262. The court looked to the legislative history of the Act as support
for its conclusion that Congress intended that criminal defendants under the
CWA only have knowledge of their conduct and not the legal significance of their
actions. See id. The court found that the 1987 amendments to the CWA demon-
strated that Congress "intended to facilitate enforcement of the Clean Water Act
and increase the impact of sanctions by creating a separate felony provision for
deliberate, as distinct from negligent, activity." Id. Comparing the Act as amended
to the original Act, the court noted that the pre-amendment CWA did not distin-
guish between criminal penalties for willful and negligent violations. See id. (citing
33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)(1) (1986)). After the 1987 amendments, however, the CWA
"segregated the penalties for negligent violations, making them misdemeanors,
and added felony provisions for knowing violations." Id. (citing 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1319(c) (1) (A) and (c) (2) (A)). In so doing, Congress changed "willful" to
"knowing," causing the court to assume that by changing words, Congress also in-
tended to change meaning. See id. (citing United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533
(2d Cir. 1995) and United States v. Sinskey, 119 F.3d 712 (8th Cir. 1997)). The
court concluded:
[b]ecause "willful" generally connotes a conscious performance of bad
acts with an appreciation of their illegality, ..., we can conclude that Con-
gress intended to provide a different and lesser standard when it used the
word "knowingly." If we construe the word "knowingly" as requiring the
defendant must appreciate the illegality of his acts, we obliterate the dis-
tinction from the willfulness.
Id. (citation omitted).
93. See Fourth Circuit Says 'Knowingly Violates' Means What It Says: Another Boost
For Intent Standard For Crimes Under Clean Water Act, 28 ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 1736,
1739 (Jan. 9, 1998) [hereinafter Fourth Circuit- BNA] (noting that Wilson reflects "a
proper reading of International Minerals"). For a discussion of the public welfare
doctrine, see supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
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concerned with pollutants that are inherently deleterious.
The legislative history of the Act records Congress' explicit
concern with public health. And the Act specifically au-
thorized research to determine the harmful effects of pol-
lutants on the health and welfare of persons. 94
The court thus joined three other federal circuit courts in recogniz-
ing that alleged violations of the CWA are public welfare offenses by
virtue of the statute's regulation of inherently deleterious
pollutants. 95
Having determined that CWA violations do fall within the am-
bit of public welfare offenses, the Wilson court acknowledged the
limits of the doctrine's reach - that is, that the public welfare doc-
trine, when properly applied, justifies exempting the government
only from proving that the defendant knew the illegality of his ac-
tions.96 Because the CWA concerns public health and safety, the
statutory requirement that violations be "knowing" means alleged
94. Wilson, 133 F.3d at 263-64 (citations omitted). In Wilson, the defendants
argued that the precedent provided by International Minerals did not apply because
the crimes they were accused of were not public welfare offenses. See id. The de-
fendants instead contended that the proper precedent to be applied in this case
was Liperota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985), in which the Supreme Court held
that when prosecuting a person for violation of a food stamp statute, the govern-
ment has to prove that the defendant knew his acts were illegal. See id. (citing
Liperota, 471 U.S. at 433). Discussing the holding of Liperota, the Wilson court rea-
soned that had the Supreme Court held otherwise, the result would have been "to
outlaw a number of acts which a reasonable person would very likely believe were
entirely unregulated, including actions that were wholly accidental." Id. at 263.
The Court's holding in Liperota was also based on the conclusion that Congress
could not have intended such a harsh result. See id. In rejecting the defendant's
argument that Liperota applied to the instant situation under the CWA, the Fourth
Circuit reiterated its conclusion that Congress did not intend to create a require-
ment that a defendant charged with a crime under the Act be aware of the illegal-
ity of his behavior. See id. (stating "we believe the several factors we have already
discussed indicate a different congressional intent than that found by the Court in
Liperota, as we too resist the temptation to create a mistake-of-law defense").
95. See id. at 263-64 (citing United States v. Sinskey, 119 F.3d 712, 716 (8th
Cir. 1997); United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 534 (2d Cir. 1995); and United
States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994)). The court applied the
public welfare doctrine even though it concluded that the pollutant at issue (na-
tive soil) was not deleterious, because it reasoned that the CWA's general purpose
concerned regulation of deleterious pollutants. See id. Therefore, the precedent
of International Minerals did apply even though that case involved the regulation of
specifically dangerous materials. See id. at 263. It is ironic that the Fourth Circuit
was willing to apply the public welfare doctrine to a case involving the discharge of
native soils, while the Fifth Circuit in Ahmad was unwilling to reach the same con-
clusion when the pollutant was gasoline and the discharge resulted in a significant
emergency response and evacuation effort.
96. See id. at 264.
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violators can be presumed to know that the government regulates
the nation's waterways. 97
At the same time, the court implicitly recognized that the pub-
lic welfare doctrine does notjustify reducing the government's bur-
den concerning intent under the CWA to prove, for example, that a
defendant simply discharged a substance into a waterway. Rather,
the opinion reflects an understanding that traditional common law
principles governing criminal intent should not be abandoned be-
cause an act may be deemed a public welfare offense. The Fourth
Circuit thus countered the government's contention advanced in
Ahmad, that the public welfare nature of CWA offenses warrants
eliminating the requirement that the government must prove the
defendant "knew the operative facts which ma[d]e [the defend-
ant's] action illegal."9 8 As Wilson makes clear, the government's liti-
gation position in Ahmad reflected a misunderstanding of the
Court's public welfare jurisprudence from Dotterweich through
Staples.99
Under the CWA, the government must prove not just that the
defendant discharged a substance into waters of the United States,
but that he did so knowing the substance was a pollutant. This con-
struction of the statute allows defendants to mount credible mis-
take-of-fact defenses: "if a defendant thought he was discharging
water when he was in fact discharging gasoline, he would not be
guilty of knowingly violating the act which prohibits the discharge
97. See id. The court listed the elements that the government must prove in
order to establish a felony violation under CWA as:
(1) that the defendant knew that he was discharging a substance, elimi-
nating a prosecution for accidental discharges; (2) that the defendant
correctly identified the substance he was discharging, not mistaking it for
a different, unprohibited substance; (3) that the defendant knew the
method or instrumentality used to discharge the pollutants; (4) that the
defendant knew the physical characteristics of the property into which
the pollutant was discharged that identify it as a wetland, such as the pres-
ence of water and water-loving vegetation; (5) that the defendant was
aware of the facts establishing the required link between the wetland and
the waters of the United States; and (6) that the defendant knew he did
not have a permit.
Id. Sensing the possibility that the last of these elements may be read as creating a
mistake-of-law defense, the court further explained that requiring the government
to prove the defendant knew he did not have a permit "does not require the gov-
ernment to show that the defendant knew that permits were available or required."
Id. Instead, this element "preserves the availability of mistake of fact defense if the
defendant has something he mistakenly believed to be a permit to make the dis-
charges for which he is being prosecuted." Id.
98. Id. at 264.
99. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's public welfare jurisprudence, see
supra notes 15-39 and accompanying text.
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of pollutants." 100 In other words, while the government must
demonstrate that the defendant knew he was discharging gasoline,
it need not prove he knew gasoline was a pollutant regulated under
CWA - this is the import of the public welfare doctrine in the
CWA context, as explained by the Wilson court.101
IV. CONCLUSION
Striking the balance between competing desires for compre-
hensive regulatory protection and fair regulatory enforcement is no
small task. While "[p]rofit, the common denominator in environ-
mental crimes, will continue to be a seductive motive to the white
collar criminal,"10 2 protecting human health and the environment
is not sufficient justification for "compromising the intent standard
that is fully accorded to defendants, including drug dealers, under
other statutes."' 03 Notwithstanding the salutary purpose of environ-
mental laws, courts must respect well-developed common law prin-
ciples such as the requirement that the government, in order to
secure a conviction, prove that the defendant acted with some in-
tent. Fundamental fairness demands no less.
With the Wilson decision, the Fourth Circuit has provided gui-
dance to courts negotiating the intersection where regulatory com-
plexity and government enforcement concerns collide. While some
commentators praise Wilson for its rejection of the defense argu-
ment that the government must prove the defendant knew his ac-
tions were illegal, 10 4 it should also be recognized for its
reconciliation of the CWA, the public welfare doctrine, and the
common law's concern "that an injury can amount to a crime only
100. Id. at 262.
101. The Wilson court's conclusions in regard to CWA are in accord, more-
over, with the construction of "knowingly" under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA). See United States v. Kelley Technical Coatings, Inc., 157
F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 1998) (concluding that under RCRA, government must prove
defendant had "knowledge of the facts that made the conduct a crime"). The
decision in Wilson also had a dramatic effect on another regulatory issue, overturn-
ing the Army Corps of Engineer's longstanding practice of regulating discharges
from sidecasting. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 258-59 ("In instructing the jury that
sidecasting was prohibited by the Clean Water Act, we believe that the district
court included conduct not prohibited by the Act, and the regulations promul-
gated under it.").
102. Turner, supra note 24, at 235.
103. Fourth Circuit - BNA, supra note 93, at 1739.
104. See Turner, supra note 24, at 235-36 (commenting that debate regarding
mens rea will continue and that environmental laws "must ensure concern and dili-
gence on the part of those in a position to do the most harm since they, frequently,
are also the ones in the best position to know and conform to the law").
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when inflicted by intention." 10 5 Given the similarity of the CWA to
many state and federal environmental statutes, other courts may
rely upon Wilson in future environmental criminal prosecutions for
its sound rejection of the prosecutor's argument that intent has vir-
tually no role to play in bringing alleged "green collar" criminals to
justice.
105. Wilson, 133 F.3d at 261 (quoting Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600,
605 (1994)).
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